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THE TARGETING OF OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS:
THE BUNDESBANK EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS
FOR NIGERIA

J.K.A. OLEKAH AND S.N. IBEABUCHI

•

--·-·-------------------------------The ultimate objective of the Bundesbank monetary policy actions is price stability. ,
fulfilling this objective the Bank targets money stock (M3) defined to include currency,
sight, time and savings deposits. The intermediate target of M3 is interest rate in the money
market which the Bundesbank seeks to control via the management of the supply of central
bank money (cbm) to the credit institutions, (banks). How much of cbm is to be supplied or
removed from the system depends on the desired demand, for currency by the non-bank
public sector and the minimum required reserves by the credit institutions. Hence the
Bundesbank forecasts the demand for cbm comprising of the currency and reserves
components consistent with the agreed M3. The liquidity (cbm) needs of the credit
institutions are carefully monitored during tire year with the view to removing any
financing gap that may constrain the attainment of the target M3. To this end the
Bundesbank carefully manipulates both the long-term adjustment and fine-tuning
instruments. The main adjustment instruments are the Lombard and Disco11r;; windows
while the fine-tuning instruments include the Repurchase (Repo), quick tender.; foreign
exchange swaps and deposit policy. The st11dy has lots of lessons for Nigeria. lt "'u.5:;:ests
that the CBN should review its OMO programming _especially by identifying the m:1jor
components of the other assets (net) of the CBN which often time distort the monitoring of
the growth in money supply. The operating target (bank reserves) of OMO should be linked
to the interest rate movement and 1.1 e size of OMO for final sale should be decided after the
bids have been received. Also tl1L 'HN should intrnduce its own instruments to complement
the existing OMO instruments; the CBN's facilities to banks should be fully backed by
acceptable collaterals; the minimum reserve requirement accounts should be de-sterilized
and a more comprehensive procedure for OMO accounting should be adopted.

Mr. J.KA. Olekah is an Assistant Director and Mr. S. N. lbeabuchi is a Principal Economist both in the
Research Department. 111is is a report of the study visit to the Bundesbank Germany from the 21st to 27th
March 1994, following bilateral contacts between the Research Department CBN Lagos and the Bundesbank
for a technical assistance in the targeting of Open Market Operations. We are very grateful to our host, the
Bundesbank, for the valuable assistance and cooperation extended to us; especially Mrs. Clink, who
effectively co-ordinated the study programme. We are also very grateful to the Management of the CBN in
general and the Director of Research in particular for giving us the opportunity to benefit from the study.
Nevertheless all views expressed here are neither that of the Bundcsbank Germany nor of the Central Bank
of Nigeria Lagos, but entirely that of the authors.
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INTRODUCTION
After about three years preparatory activities, the CBN conducted open market
operations (OMO) for the first time on June 30, 1993. Since then, OMO has been
conducted every week through the Discount Houses. Overtime, the need for
country studies on OMO targeting became apparent as the operations of the market
became increasingly complex. Consequently, arrangement was concluded with the
Bundesbank which has long and useful experiences in open market operations, for
a study visit on the forecasting of OMO target between 21st - 27th March 1994.
!he major objective of the study tour was to learn the techniques of OMO targeting
m the Bundesbank; in addition, the study covered the strategy for determining•::~
~
equilibrium money rn:uket interest rates.
The rest of this rerort

1s

divided into riv.: pa~t:-:-

(i) Monetary Targeting in Germany
(ii) Liquidity Managemet!!

(iii) Strategies for .:nsurmg eyuilibrium mow:y rnai Ket r;1t<.:~
(iv) The implication ot the study for Nigrna
(v) Concluding summary.

1. MONETARY TARGETING
The overall objective of open market operations in Germany is to ensure the
attainment of a money stock (M3) target, compatible with long-term price stability.
The ultimate objective of Bundesbank monetary policy is thus , rice stability, while
the intermediate target of policy, is money stock (M3), broadly defined to include
currency, sight, time and savings deposits held at credit institutions (banks). The
choice of M3 as an intermediate target of policy, which began in 1988 is informed
mainly by the long-time close empirical relationship existing between prices and
M3. Furthermore, M3 has shown stable and positive correlation with the growth of
nominal (overall) production potentials as well as a negative correlation with
interest rate movements. M3 enjoys a high degree of stability in the German
financial system and has not been seriously impeded by financial innovations
owing to the efficient provision of virtually all financial services by the German
universal banks, consequently minimizing the incidence of leakages in monetary
policy implementation.
The Bank estimates the annual M3 (ex-ante) at the beginning of each year, as the
growth of the real production potential plus an unavoidable rate of price rise(s)
(nominal) and the change(s) in velocity of circulation of money. The forecast of the
annual M3 is guided by the following equation: (see also the complete portfolio
demand, interest rates and exchange rates model in the appendix).
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M3/W = M3 (ZM, r, BSP/W)
where
M3:

broad money stock

W:

Private financial wealth

ZM:

Monetary Asset yield

BSP:

Nominal GNP
long-term Interest rate.

r:

In order to capture exogenous influences on monetary developmen• and
short-term disruptions in the functioning of financial market as well as the
difficulties of the statistical measurements of the money supply, the Bank sin0..
19791 sets the monetary target in terms of corridor (range). The resulting monetary
target is discussed and coordinated with the Federal Government. The Bundesbank
has always been of the view that, it is of decisive importance for all concerned in
the economic process to act in a way that is compatible with stability, such as, all
expenditure units should adjust their income demands to the growth performance of
the econqmy. Infringements of this requirement(s) mark out the limits to an
effective monetary policy. If expenditure by the state, consumption wishes of
households, capital expenditure and external demands on the national product
together exceed the production potentials of the economy, adjustment crises with
ensuring disruptions of price movements, employments and growth in the economy
will sooner be inevitable. For this reason, the stance of monetary policy and its
basic features as well as the strategy is expl_ained to the trade union, the enterprises
associations and the general public to help instill proper understanding of monetary
policy actions.
For implementation and control purposes, the annual M3, is further projected
into quarterly and monthly targets. The quarterly targets of M3, use the same
explanatory variables as in equation 1, except that dummies are introduced to
capture seasonal influences on the demand for 111oney. The monthly targets of M3,
are based on less quantitative techniques especially as the GNP figures are not
available on monthly basis.

Operating Target of M3
As in most developed financial environment, the market interest rates in Germany
are of crucial importance to the expenditure decisions of investors and consumers.
Changes in market interest rates have considerable effect on general propensities tc,
invest/spend with implications for M3 and eventually economic activity. Thus the
strategy of the Bank is to monitor movements in interest rates very closely. Since
the German financial environment is basically market driven, the Bundesbank
controls the interest rates indirectly through the supply of central bank money
1

The Bank briefly returned to a single figure forecast in 1989.
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( cbm) defined to include currency in circulation ( cic) and the minimum required
reserves (mrr) which are held at the Bundesbank. The choice of cbm as an
intermediate instrument of interest rate and M3, rest on the fact that cbm and M3,
have identical definition and components. For instance, cic, a liability of the
Bundesbank is a component of cbm and also of M3. The other component of cbm,
the mrr, is derived as a positive function of the banks total deposit liabilities which
is also a major component of M3. This implies that if the Bundesbank is not
prepared to provide credit institutions with new cbm to feed cic and maintain
growing mrr, money creation by banks would soon come to a standstill. The
Bundesbank therefore works indirectly towards ensuring that the target M3
develops along the envisaged path by constantly reviewing the quantum and terms
on which it makes chm available.

Optimal Demand For CBM
In order to provide chm consistent with M3 target, the Bank, forecasts the optimal
level of demand which must be equal to the supply of chm. The estimation of
Jptimal demand for chm is guided by the following behavioural equation.
~.

ZEBA = (BSRP, PSM3/PINV, GAP).
where:
ZEBA = Provision of central bank money
BSRP = Aggregate supply at 1985 prices
PSM3 = Long-term price level
PINY = Price deflator of domestic demand
GAP = Utilization rate of production capacity(%).

The estimated annual levels are forecast into quarterly and monthly as well as
,eekly targets by incorporating dummy variables which capture the influence of
easonal factors. (see fig. 1). Indeed the daily foresast is intended to track weekly
uget, which in turn is expected to keep monthly estimates on course and
ventually track the quarterly and annual targets, all things being equal. However, it
; not unusual that in the normal money market operations, daily and weekly
emand for and supply of chm would deviate from target owing to some fortuitous
1ctors. As a result, there are regular review of the Bundesbank's money market
peration with the view to eliminating deviations from target observed in previous
rerations such that the overall average chm supplied in any given year is not
gnificantly different from the agreed target. Also most importantly, the Bank
1dertakes general review of the monetary policy measures every half-year.
(perience however, indicates that the Bank rarely changes its targets; instead it
1s reviewed deviations from agreed target and tries to put m place measures
pable of eliminating the deviations during the rest of the year. The only occasion
1en the Bundesbank had to change its policy targets in recent times, was in 1991
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following the unification of the West and East Germany.

II. LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
Liquidity management in Germany embraces largely the operations of the money
market which are closely interlinked with the monetary policy of the Bundesbank.
The money market involves mainly inter-bank dealings in central bank balances
which affords the credit institutions the opportunity to make their excess chm
available t'J other banks thus ensuring horizontal liquidity adjustment within the
banking system. Furthermore the money market enables liquidity bottlenecks and
surplus positions foreseeable or expected in the future to be bridged, hence
affording the Bundcsbank, the opportunity to satisfy its short- term monetary
policy goals.

ll(a) The Supply of and Demand for Central Bank Money (chm)
The Bundesbank is the ultimate source of cbm, due essentially to the Bank's role as
the sole issuer of currency. On daily and weekly basis, banks demand chm for
purposes of maintaining an appropriate minimum reserve pusitions and for meeting
the currency demand of the non-bank public. Credit institutions in Germany arc
known to keep reserve balances at not more than the required minimum lcve!
especially as they do not attract any interest income unlike in some other Central
Banks e.g. Bank of England in the U.K. The minimum requirement is calculated
from the average of the credit institutions' liabilities subject to reserve requirement
during the last two weeks of the preceding munth and the first two weeks of the
current month."
Thereafter a corridor (range), indicating an upper (a) and lower (b) limits as
shown in fig 2 is constructed. The line c is the desired average. Since the minimum
required balances arc computed as the average of the specified deposit liabilities in
the month, credit institutions may draw on their balances with the Bundcsbank
below the minimum required in between months, provided the average in the
month is not less than the require minimum. It is therefore a common practice that
towards the end months, banks endeavour to redres~ any foreseeable liquidity
dis-equilibra by availing themselves of liquidity facilities in the Bundesbank.

2

See Page 28 of the Deutsche Bundesbank: 11s monetary po:icy inslrumcnls and func11ons. 3rd Fdilinn July

1989
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Fig.1
Zur Entwicklung des Zentralbankgeldbedar1s in 1993 *)
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II(b). Instruments of Liquidity Management
There are a number of instruments through which the Bundesbank influences the
supply of cbm. These instruments can be divided into long-run adjustment and
fine-tuning measures, although the borderline is not distinctly clear. The liquidity
pofay instruments of longer-term adjustment arc designed to meet the bank's need
for cbm on a permanent or long-term basis, or to limit their liquidity scope. The
main measures involved are changes in the minimum reserve ratios and the banks'
re-financing facilities as well as definitive purchases or sales of long-term bonds by
the Bundesbank in the open market. With respcct to the intercst rate policy, the
setting of the discount and lombard rates provide a long-term bench mark for
interest rates in the money and credit markets. The fine-tuning measures, on the
other hand, are mainly used to neutralize temporary fluctuations in bank liquidity
and steer the money market rates discreetly, in the desired direction. Fine-tuning
measures include open market operations in the widest sense \\'ith maturities of
between less than one week and one to two months. Examples arc day-to-day shifts
of public funds to the banking system, sales of short-term Treasury ·bills,
transactions under repurchase agreements in bonds, in trade bills, foreign exchange
swap and repurchase transactions. The open market operations arc highly flexible
as they can be used almost entirely at the discretion of the Bundesbank. However
recourse by banks to utilized rediscount facilities and lombard loan is generally on
the initiative of the banks themselves.
The lombard loan is the most expensive of the Bundesbank facility because of
its high interest rates, consequently, banks use this facility only as a measure of l;ist
resort. The rediscount window on the other hand, carries the lowest rate in the
market but banks are not permitted tu borrow more than their respective quota. On
the whole, the most popular source of facility is the Rcpo which is prnvidcJ
through the weekly open market operations (OMO). (sec fig. 3) The interest rates
on Repo are market determined and relatively moderate when compared to the
lombard rates, though higher than the Rediscount window rates. However, because
the Repo facility via OMO is available only once a week, it does not completely
smooth out the daily fluctuations in interest rates/resource gap. Thus, as mentioned
earlier, in order to avoid excessive daily fluctuations in interest rate, the Bank"s
repurchase operations are supplemented by a number of other reversible
fine-tuning measures. These include the sale of short-term treasury bills, open
market operations under foreign exchange swap or repurchase agreements, and the
shifts of public authorities deposits to the credit institutions. Credit institutions also
trade among themselves for cbm as the deficit units seek to buy chm from the
surplus units.
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Vo 1-2
ZUR LIQUIDITATSLAGE DER BANKEN IM MARZ 1994
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Fig. 3
3
Structure of hank re-financing with the Bundesbank

Percentage shares in total refinancing (based on average amounts
outstanding during period)
Discount credit
under rediscount
and refinancing
quotas

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

74.6
77.5
69.6
73.4
67.4
57 8
60.8
61 7
47.8
35.6
39.3
36.5
33.1
27.0

Recourse to
special quotas for
money market
paper eligible for
purchase by the
Bundersbank

8.9
9 l

10.3
10.5
9.1
62
5.4
50
3.8
3.4
2.9
14
0.9
0.7

Security-based
repurchase
agreement~

6.0
6.9
14.8
8.0
15.9
34 7
33 2
33.0
47.7
59.9
56.3
61.1
65 4
718

Lombard or
special lombard
loans

10.5
6.5
5.3
8.1
7.6
1.3

0.6
0.3
0.7
1.1

1.5
1.0
0.6
0.5

II(c). Optimal Supply of Central Bank Money (chm)
The Bundesbank at all times seeks to supply cbm adjudged to be consistent with
the annual M3 target. How much of central bank money (cbm) is supplied or
removl.'.d from the system depends on the deviation of the actual cbm from agreed
optima as computed from equ;ition 2~. The cbm is the li;ibility of the Bundesbank
and is obtainable from the Bank"s balance sheet (sec fig. 4).

3
4

Excluding open markel transaclions in trade bills under re:iurchase agreements, Foreign exchange swaps,
shifts of Federal Funds under section 17 of the Bundesbank Act and quick tenders.
For monthly, weekly and daily cbm target, the rcsull obtained from equation 2 is discretionally adjusted to
reflect or capture non-quantitallve factors.
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Fig. 4
A SIMPLIFIED WEEKLY RETURN OF THE BUNDESBANK
STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

ASSETS

LIABILITIES

Net monetary reserves (NMR)

Currency in circulation (CC)

Bills of exchange (BE)

Deposits of Banks (DB)

Lombard Loans (LL)

Net Deposits of Public authorities
(NDP)

Open market operations (OMO)

Other Liabilities (OL)

Other assets (QA)

-------------------------

The information content of the Bundesbank balance sheet derives primarily from
the liquidity policy relations of the Bank with the credit institutions. Thus the
Bank"s balance sheet is so arranged that the Bundesbank's liabilities that constitute
thL· chm are equaled to other variables.
3.

chm =CC+ DB= NMR + BE+ LL+ OMO + OA - OL- NDP

However actual chm ( daily) levels are available with a lag of one day hence for
purposes of maintaining cffcctive management of chm, the Bank forecasts the
perceived chm by examining and analysing the balance sheet of the Bundesbank.
The historical levels of the Bank balance sheet in the recent several months, weeks
aml Jay'.-> arc analysed and used to forecast the perceived chm on daily basis for a
PninJ ul unc month. The forecast values arc revised as firm figures are obtained.
T1,ereaftcr the tnrcc1'.->t (chm) is compared with target, to obtain the deviation from
,,lf_l'('(

!l(d).

TargctofOMO

However to arrive al the OMO target, the deviation from target is further reviewed
by taking cognisance of all other factors that influence Bundesbank's supply of

reserves to the system, such as:
(a) Lombard loans

( h) Rcdiscount window facility
(c) Government deposit released into the system
( d) Interventi.£n m foreign exchange market (swaps)
(c) Other short-dated monetary paper of the Bundesbank
(f) Maturing repo;
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This means that the optimal OMO for the market is adjusted, by ensuring proper
accounting of the OMO which takes into consideration the net positions of the
above instruments as follows:
4.

OMO =CC+ DB - NMR - BE - LL - OA + OL + NDP.

Il(e). OMO and Repo
Open market transactions under repurchase agreements have acquired increasing
importance. Since 1979, the Bank has purchased from credit institutions which
have to hold minimum reservt.:s, fixed interest securities that are eligible as
collateral for lombard loan on condition that they sell/buy the securities
back/forward at the same tune. The securities have to be officially listed on a stock
exchange such as Bonds of the Federal Governmrnt, the Federal Railways, th~
Federal Post Office and Treasury discuunt papn of thest.: official issut.:rs with a
remaining period to maturity of up to one year. In fact, all facilities from the Bank
to credit institutions must be fully backed by acceptable collateral, hence to qualify
for Bundesbank facility, cm.lit institutions should havt.: sufficient securitit.:s of any
of the above instrumrnts in the common 'pool· in the Bank. For this rt.:ason crt.:dit
institutions lodge with the Bundesbank their huldings of instruments that qualify
for eligibility for loans. The lodgment constitutes a liability on tht.: Bank"s balance
sheet. Consequently, any facility from the Bank to credit institutions reduces its
indt.:bkdness as a corresponding credit ikm is created on the assets side of tht.:
balance sheet. However the entries are reversed when loans/facilities are rt.:deemed.
The OMO in repo is conducted every wet.:k for a maturity period of two weeks.
The Bundesbank conducts the OMO directly with credit institutions so as to give
each institution direct access to the Bank's credit facilities. This is unlike in the
Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System of the U.S where OMO is
conducted via Discount Houses and Principal Dealers, respectively.

11(1) INFORMATION GATHERING
In order to maintain a reliable system of information gathering and dissemination,
the Bundesbank, in addition to its Head olli-:e in Frankfurt uses its L1nd Central
Bank (9 in number) each with a network of branch offices located in the cities and
towns to gather and distribute information. For example, the head office in
Frankfurt announces the weekly Repo for the OMO via the Reuters and its Land
Central Banks on the morning of every Tuesday. By the close of 3.00 p.m. on
Tuesday, credit institutions submit bids to the L1nd Central Bank which in turn
collates the bids and forward same to the head office in Frankfurt. The head office
collates all the bids from the entire Federation and arranges the bids in a
descending order of bid rates. By the morning of Wednesday a day after the notice
of the market has been given, the Bank Directorate meets at about 10. a.m. in
Frankfurt over the collated bids (sec fig. 5) to decid( on the final amount of Rcpo
for OMO. This is to say, that the amount of reserves provided under Rcpo is
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ultimately decided at the Bundesbank discretion irrespective of the notice given for
the market and this is done usually after bids have been received and assembled.

II(g). Influence of Policy Making Bodies on OMO
There are two main policy making bodies viz the Central Bank Council and the
Bundesbank Directorate, whose decisions influence the size of OMO. The Central
Bank Council is the supreme policy making body. It meets bi-weekly on Thursday,'
to review the general trends in monetary and credit developments in order to decide
on the stance of liquidity measures for the weeks ahead. Specifically, it considers
the stand of OMO for the next two weeks and its decisions are usually qualitative
in nature, such as what method of Repo should be employed (volume or interest
rate tender). Usually when the liquidity of the financial environment is not very
certain the Bank may prefer the use of volume tender which permits credit
institutions to decide on the size of the issues at rate fixed by the Bank. The next
body is the Bundesbank Directorate. It meets every Wednesday at 10.a.m. to
implement the broad decisions of the Council. Its actions are very quantitative such
as deciding on how much or value of the Repo that should be sold; and at what
price. Indeed, irrespective of the type of tender, the Directorate has the ultimate
discretion to decide on the size of Repo as well as the interest rate. The
Dir:·,;\urate's decisions are based mainly on collated information from the repo
ter k-1. Fig. 5 is a sample of some of the information forwarded to the Directorate
meeting. The total value of OMO expected is DM 76.0 billion. The method of
tender is interest rate tender. Allocation of OMO is by the US style, thus bids above
the standard allotment rate receive full allotment. The marginal bid lies between
D.M. 75.987 billion and DM 92.065 billion. Additional information is provided
beyond the marginal bids to assist the Directorate in making decision. For instance,
bids beyond the marginal bids have implications for interest rates. If the Directorate
considers tightening liquid1ty, it may decide to settle at bids before the DM 76.0
b1!i1lm; alternatively if it dccides to ease liquidity, then the bid rates would need to
he lnwercd by selecting :1 bid aftcr the initial marginal bid.

H(il). Types of Repurchase Agreements
There arc two types of repurchase agreement - repurchase agreement by interest
rate tender and repurchase agreement by volume tender. For a volume tender, the
Bundeshank does not announce the volume but sets the rate of interest while banks
arc asked to bid for the amount of securities that they wish to obtain at the specified
rate nf interest. Funds are allocated to individual banks or institutions on the basis
of a uruform allocation ratio, (Dutch style) with each individual bank's bid being
r :duced in proportion to the overall purchase/bid ratio.
For an interest rate tender, the banks are requested to submit bids containing
i-irith the amount of securities and the repurchase rate. Unlike the volume tender, the
Bcmk, anncunces the valu~ of securi1ics it intends to offer. The allocation of funds
i, presently made on the basis of the different repurchase rates bid of the credit
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institutions (U.S Style).

III.ACHIEVING EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RA TE IN THE
MONEY MARKET
Backed by its key position in the supply of cbm, the Bundesbank uses the
instruments at its disposal to structure interest rates and supply and demand
conditions in the money market in line with its monetary objectives. As earlier
indicated there are two broad instruments viz, instruments for longer-run
adjustments and instruments for fine tuning, (see Fig. 6). Under the longer-run
adjustment, are the lombard and discount rates, the fine tuning rates are the treasury
bill selling rates and repurchase rates. Fig.7 reveals that in the structure of rates, the
lombard is the highest while the discount is the floor. All other rates fall in between
the two except in very rare occasions.
The strategy for seeking to achieve an equilibrium rate is very complex. However, it could be simplified as follows: Firstly, the Bank changes its own interest
rates for re-financing transactions and open market operations. Secondly it chooses
what appear to be the best channel through which to provide or withdraw central
bank money; and finally the Bank decides on the timing of intt;rventions in the
money market and the appropriate period to make liquidity available on the market.
Indeed through its management of liquidity in the money market, the
Bundesbank exerts direct impact on interest rates. On a longer term, the Bank
influences the willingness of banks to lend and the demand fqr money and credit in
the economy in the desired direction through the transmission channels. The result
is that monetary expansion takes place at a pace compatible with the desired
monetary target and money market rates.

IV.IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY FOR NIGERIA
The German experience in OMO has relevant lesson(s) for Nigeria's quest for an
efficient framework for targeting OMO.

Targeting OMO
(1) As in the Central Bank of Nigeria, the framework for forecasting the target for_
OMO in the Bundesbank is based on the analysis of the central bank balance
sheet. However, unlike in Nigeria, the other assets (net) of the Bundesbank,
one of the determinants of central bank money, constitute an insignificant
proportion of total liabilities/assets of the Bank whereas in Nigeria, the other assets
(net) of the CBN constitute a substantial portion of the total monetary assets. The
main implication of having a negligible other assets (net) in the Bundesbank is that
the determinants of central bank money and OMO target are reduced to a number
of variables which the Bank can effectively control. On the other hand, when
other assets(net) is considerably large and significant as in the case of CBN, it
becomes difficult and almost impossible to effectively influence the
determinants of OMO through the use of the instruments under the authorities
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Fig. 6
Instruments of monetary policy in Germany
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l.
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3.
4.

Selling rates set for bill-type Bundesbank "liquidity paper·• (under section 42 respectively of Bundesbank
Act) act as a floor for the call money rate.
Allotment rates of security-based repurchase agreements influence the determination of short-term money
market rates (especially through expectations).Redepositing of Federal government cash balances held with the Bundesbank in the money market
( according to section 17 of the Bundesbank Act).Repurchase agreements in fixed-interest securities are used for "fine-tuning" banks' reserve position during
calendar months and for satisfying banks' long-run re-financing needs on a ''roll-over'' basis.
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Fig.7
Operatin!=) variables in the money market
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control. Hence in order to ensure an efficient targeting of OMO, the CBN should
review its balance sheet items for OMO programming especially by seeking to
identify the major factors responsible for the erratic movements in other assets
(net)
2. The operating target (central bank money) of the Bundesbank policy is
inversely related to interest rate while in the case of CBN, the operating target
of policy (reserves) is not necessarily linked to interest rates owing largely to
the long period of interest rate repression. The established link between money
and reserves in the CBN is via the monetary base. In view of the on-going
deregulation of the financial sector in Nigeria and the obvious theoretical link
between interest rates and prices ( an ultimate objective of CBN policy), interest
rates should be the most appropriate indicator of liquidity management. To this
end it is necessary that the operating target of policy (reseives) should, as soon as
practicable be determined in relation to agreed interest rate policy. Consequently,
there is urgent need for thorough studies in money, reseives and interest rates
relationships in order to provide guidance to policy making and implementation.
In addition, there is need to construct yield cuives in order to guide transactions in
the secondary market.

Size of OMO
3. The Economic Department of the Bundesbank has the primary responsibility
for forecasting the OMO target and forwarding same to the Credit Department
of the Bank for implementation. Similarly, in the CBN, the Research
Department is responsible for forecasting the OMO target and forwarding the
result to the Banking Operations Department. As earlier stated, the amount of
OMO sold is finally determined by the Bundesbank Directorate after OMO
bids have been received and collated. In the case of the CBN, there has been
less flexibility in deciding exact kvel of OMO as sales have more often than
not been restricted to pre-announced targets even when actual market outcome
could indicate otherwise. The issue of deciding on the actual level of OMO for
the market after bids must have been received has one major advantage. In
particular, it gives the authorities the opportunity of correcting any forecasting
error associated with the OMO projections especially as OMO is influenced by
both market fundamentals and technical factors which are not easily captured
simultaneously with short-term forecasting models. While short-term models
are most able to track technical factors, the market fundamentals manifest iL'>elf
sufficiently well only in the relatively long term. The CBN should adopt the
method of deciding on the final OMO sales only after the bids must have been
5
received. To this ends, a high level committee consisting of five members
drawn from the present OMOC and MPCC should be constituted and charged
5

The IMF study team, on Improvement of OMO in Nigeria, had earlier recommended that the Bank need not
announce the volume of OMO until it has received the bids.

383

CBN ECONOMIC AND f1NANCIAL REVIEW, VOL. 32, NO. 4

with the responsibility for deciding on the final level of OMO sales. The
modalities of operations for this committee could be worked out later.

Use of CBN Instruments for OMO
4.

In Germany, OMO is conducted through Bundesbank's instruments; as a result
the Bank has sufficient leverage in terms of pricing, timing and size of issues.
In the CBN, OMO is presently conducted through treasury securities which the
Bank has limited control. For instance, because the market is operated through
government securities, OMO denominated treasury securities which have
relatively short period to maturity can not be allowed to sell at rates higher than
rates on similar instruments in the primary market with relatively long tenure.
Also because the amount of OMO securities for the market is dependent on
treasury bills outstanding, the CBN has had to sell less than the market
demands owing to lack of bills of desired tenure. Moreover, since the partial
re-regulation of the economy at the beginning of 1994, there has been
dwindling response in OMO from prospective participants largely because the
treasury bills rates are no longer market determined. The re-activation of
banks' interest in OMO is very crucial for effLctive liquidity management and
this can be achieved only when the Bank uses its own instruments which would
allow it the freedom to change the size of OMO securities, influence the
pricing and timing of issues in accordance with developments in the market.

Use of more short-tenured securities
5.

Instruments of short-tenure reduce the risk associated with the long waiting
time that goes with instruments of relatively long maturity. In the Bundesbank,
the maturity of the OMO instruments (repurchase agreement) was initially
about 63 days, but presently the security tenure is not more than 14 days,
suggesting that over time the system has found short-tenured securities
relatively most appropriate for liquidity management. For this reason, the type
of CBN own securities for OMO under suggestion should be of very short
tenure. The CBN presently conducts Repo sales/purchases in treasury bills,
with the discount houses on limited basis and for very short periods. It may be
necessary, to consider on a fairly extensive scale, repo sale/purchases in CBN.
instruments for a maturity period of about 14 days. To this end, the experience
of the Bundesbank in Repo market would be highly relevant which the
Research and Banking Operations Departments in the CBN could benefit from.

CBN facilities to banks
6.

Financial facilities from the Bundesbank to credit institutions are fully backed
by collaterals as institutions seeking to benefit from the Bank·s credit must
have sufficient eligible securities including treasury securities. Indeed the
Bundesbank is by law precluded from granting any form of credit to the
Federal Government; hence the public sector re-financing requirement are
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sourced outside the Bnndesbank, mainly from the money and capital market.
To induce the credit instituti01ts to finance the federal government, the
Bundesbank makes holdings of treasury securities and other eligible
instruments, a precondition for the Bank's credit. Consequently, to ensure
eligibility for Bundesbank facility, credit institutions invest their idle reserves
in eligible securities and keep same in a 'general pool' with the Bank.
Whenever the Bank extends financial accommodation to any of the institutions,
it simply debits the credit institutions general pool accounts and credits the
Bank's credit facility accounts. At the moment credit facilities from the CBN
to the banking system is not fully backed by collaterals (securities). It would be
beneficial to the banking system if CBN credit to banks are fully backed by
collaterals as in Germany. The CBN should desist from financing government
deficits but should give enough inducement to banks to do so in order to
minimize the level of inflationary financing in the system.

De-sterilization of the Reserve Requirements Accounts
7. A major factor contributing to the high incidence of bank's over-drawn
accounts with the CBN, is the sterilization of the required reserve accounts in
the ,Bank. 6 Presently, the reserve requirement of the banks are kept in a
separate account in the CBN, without any interest paid on them, yet banks are
not allowed access to such deposits.7 As in Germany, banks in Nigeria are
subject to minimum reserve requirements which must be observed on average
basis. Unlike in Nigeria, the required reserve deposits of the credit institutions
in the Bundesbank are not sterilised neither are they kept in a separate account.
Instead the minimum reserves and excess reserve deposits are kept in a single
general account and banks are free to draw on the general account provided the
average level during the maintenance period is not less than the required
minimum. It could be reasoned that if idle reserves in the sterilized accounts is
allowed to flow freely to banks to cushion temporary liquidity shortfalls, the
incidence of overdrawn position with the CBN by banks could be minimized
all things being equal. The Central Bank of Nigeria, should therefore
reconsider allowing banks to draw on the reserve accounts provided the
average level during the maintenance period does not fall below the agreed
minimum.

Lender of last resort
8. The CBN should design an effective and relatively comprehensive policy of its
facilities to banks, such that recourse to the Bank would only be used on a
lender of last resort basis. For instance, re-financing facility to banks should be
6

7

A similar view was expressed by the IMF mission in March 1994, during their sludy on improvement of
Open Market Operations in Nigeria.
Io the Bank of England, even though the Bank does not specify minimum reserve requirement, banks are
paid interest for depositing with the Bank of England.
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on quota as in the Bundesbank while direct loans should carry a panel rate.
Nevertheless, all facilities should be fully backed by acceptable collaterals as
discussed earlier on.

Data Gathedng and Analysis
9. The Bundesbank invests adequately on data gathering and analysis; largely for
this reason the Bank has made tremendous success in the conduct of OMO
even without the use of discount houses and principal dealers. The Bundesbank
utilises its Land Central Bank which has a number of branch offices in the
major cities and towns, to collect the required information. Presently, the CBN
has ~tate branches and Zonal Offices as well as Currency Centres in all the
state capitals of the federation and it is necessary that these state branches and
zonal offices should be optimally utilized in gathering the relevant data on
OMO and other useful information than presently the case. As at now, the
forecast of OMO target is based largely on Lagos Head Office's trial balances
as the state branch returns are not readily available. The state branches of the
CBN an<;l the zonal offices could be used to gather the relevant information on
OMO from outside the head office (Lagos) provided the operational
arrangement is efficiently designed to ensure effective use of human and
financial resources.
10. Desk officers involved in OMO forecasting and compilation in the Bundesbank
are continually reviewing and revising the OMO data 1s new information is
received. In the same way, the desk officer responsible for forecasting OMO
target in the CBN should also be seen to review its estimates regularly while
the trading desk re-calculates the CBN net re-financing facility to banks as
frequently as practicable. Finally the CBN should adopt a more comprehensive
method of accounting for OMO activities so as to ensure efficient targeting of
the intermediate instrument of money. To this end, some practices in the
Bundesbank that are relevant to our own environment would be of great
lesson(s) to the CBN.

V. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The framework for targeting OMO in the Bundesbank begins with the·
determination of a target M3 which is, forecast on the assumptions of the growth in
the production potentials, rise in price and the change in velocity of money in
circulation. Next is to obtain the intermediate target of M3, 'interest rate', in the
money market which is controlled through an operating instrument, the central
bank money, comprising of the minimum required reserves and currency in
circulation. The strategy for arriving at the desired money market interest rate
involves very pragmatic techniques. The Bundesbank so to speak feels its way by
the flexible use of fine-tuning instruments so as to achieve longer-term
adjustments. The Bank decides on individual measures designed to creat~ the
desired conditions in the money market by establishing suitable short-term
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operational for hank liquidity (central bank money) and money market rates v,hich
arc in line with the longer term objective of policy. During the year, the Bank
continuously examines when and if necessary to what extent deviations from
assumed short-term target path should be corrected through adjustment of the
conditions in the money market.
A number of instruments arc manipulated by the Bank in attempt(s) to achieve
equilibrium in the money market. These include the Lombard loan; rcdiscount
window facility, release of government deposit with the central bank to the credit
institutions; intervention in foreign exchange market, repurchase agreement
(OMO) and other short-dated monetary paper of the Bundcshank. These
instruments can be divided into longer-run adjustment designed to meet the hanks·
need on a permanent basis while the fine-tuning measures arc used to neutralize
temporary fluctuations in hank liquidity.
The experiences of the Bundeshank operations have relevant messages for
Nigeria's quest for an efficient framework for target111g OMO. In this regards. the
CBN needs to review the components ot other assets (net) in the Bank's balance
sheet in order to ensure that the Authority exernses ctkctive control on factors
intluencing the target of OMO. The operating target (hank reserves) should he
linked to interest rates movement; the si~e of OMO for final sale should he decided
after the hid'> have been received and the CBN should design more short-tenured
securities as well as introduce its own instruments for OMO. All facilities from the
CBN to banks should be fully backed by acceptable collaterals; de-sterilize the
reserve requirement accounts so as to make idle reserves accessible to banks in
order to reduce the incidence of large over-drawn positions with the Bank. Finally
OMO data gathering and analysis in the CBN should be improved hy involving the
State and Zonal branches of the CBN in the collection and dissemination of OMO
information while the Bank should adopt a more comprehensive accounting
technique for OMO.
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H.

Variables

Notation in the stylized version differs from notation in the complete
model. Some of the exogenous variables in the stylized version are
endogenous in the complete model.
A
ALQ
ALQN
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HSP
HSR
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e
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FIi
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FU
FZ
G

GAP
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m
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MS
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p
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PR
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rdf
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Total hc,ur~ wc,rkecl
Unemployment rate
Normal unemployment rate
Employed pcr~on~
Normal GNP
Real GNP
Potential real GNP
Currency
Real private con~umpt1on
User co~L, of cap1t,1l
Deposit~
Labour force
Exchange rate
Fixed labour co~t,
Savings of private households
Government budget
Surplus or deficit firms
Excess central bank money
Nominal government expenditure
Capacity utilization
Other financial assets
Effective working hours
Real investment
Real imports
Real capital stock
Production costs
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Trade balance
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Expected deflator of final demand
Foreign prices
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Long-term price level
Profits
Long-term interest rate
Money market interest rate
Foreign money market interest rate
Deposit rate
Central bank inerest rate

L:xngcnnu,

Exogcnou,

Exogenous

Exogenous

Exogenous
Exogenous

Exogenous
Exogenous
Exogenous

Exogenous
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I

TD
TI
TR
TRA

TRB
TRS
u
V

w
w
X

y
Yf
YV
z
zm
ZA
ZK

Indirect tax rate
Direct taxes
I ndi reel taxes
Total transfer payments
Unemployment henefits
Pension~
Residual transfer payrnenh
Direct tax rate
Normal wage rnte
Private financial wealth
Effective hourly wage rate
Real exports
Real final demanJ
Foreign real final Jcmand
Dispo5able income
Average yield on private P"rtfr·lio
Monetary asset yield
Foreign re~erve5 of central bank
Dome5tic a5sets of central hank

Exogenous

Exogenous
Exogenous

Exogenous

Exogenous
Exogenous

I. Parameters
b
d
b

Long-term income elaMicity of money
Depreciation rate
Overtime parameter
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